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For the past fifteen years, the execution of Roger Coleman has
served as perhaps the most infamous illustration of the U.S.
Supreme Court's determination to help the states achieve finality in
their criminal cases. Convicted of rape and murder in 1982, Coleman
steadfastly maintained his innocence and drew many supporters
to his cause. In its 1991 ruling in Coleman v. Thompson, however,
the Court refused to consider the constitutional claims raised in
Coleman's habeas petition. The Court ruled that Coleman had for-
feited his right to seek habeas relief when, in prior state proceedings,
his attorneys mistakenly filed their notice of appeal one day late.
Amidst international media attention, Virginia authorities executed
Coleman the following year. Faced with continuing controversy about
the case, the governor of Virginia ordered new DNA tests in January
2006-tests that confirmed Coleman's guilt and finally brought an
end to a story that began with a young woman's death twenty-five
years earlier.
In this Article, Professor Pettys argues that there are important
lessons to be learned from the fact that finality was not achieved in
Coleman's case until long after the Supreme Court declared the case
closed. Although finality is a worthy goal, the Court has failed to
account for the fact that finality is exceptionally elusive when the
public fears that a person facing severe punishment was convicted of
a crime he or she did not commit. Although the Court has said it will
adjudicate the merits of a procedurally flawed habeas petition when
a prisoner makes a persuasive showing of innocence, Professor Pettys
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argues that the Court's habeas jurisprudence suffers from an
"innocence gap'"--a gap between the amount of exculpatory evidence
sufficient to thwart finality and the amount of exculpatory evidence
sufficient to persuade a federal court to forgive a prisoner's
procedural mistakes and adjudicate the merits of his or her
constitutional claims. Professor Pettys concludes by arguing that
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INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 1992, authorities at Virginia's Greensville Correc-
tional Center executed Roger Keith Coleman.' Ten years earlier, a
Buchanan County jury had found Coleman guilty of raping and
murdering Wanda McCoy, Coleman's sister-in-law.2 In the years
between Coleman's conviction and execution, however, Coleman's
attorneys and supporters had galvanized the nation by amassing an
impressive body of evidence that raised significant doubts about
Coleman's guilt. In its issue dated May 18, 1992, Time magazine
placed a photograph of Coleman on its cover with the headline,
'This Man Might Be Innocent; This Man Is Due To Die."3 Newsweek
and The New Republic, ABC's Nightline and PrimeTine Live, NBC's
Today, CNN's Larry King Live, the Donahue show, the Washington
Post, the New York Times, USA Today, and numerous other media
outlets featured Coleman's story, as well.4 Pope John Paul II and
thousands of Americans urged Virginia's Governor L. Douglas
Wilder to grant Coleman clemency,5 but Governor Wilder refused,
based in part on Coleman's performance on a lie detector test ad-
ministered the morning of his execution.6 As the hour of Coleman's
1. See Robert L. Jackson & David G. Savage, Final Appeals Rejected, Killer Is Executed,
L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A16 (reporting Coleman's execution).
2. See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307 S.E.2d 864, 865, 875 (Va. 1983).
3. See 14 Years Ago in Time, TIME, Jan. 23, 2006, at 21 (reprinting the cover of its issue
dated May 18, 1992); Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40 (providing
a lengthy account of Coleman's case).
4. See JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 232-33 (1997) (describing the media coverage); James Warren, Major Legal,
Media Blitz Fails To Halt Execution, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1992, at C1 (describing the media
coverage of Coleman's case and reporting that, on the day before Coleman's execution, prison
officials told at least one local reporter that Coleman "was now speaking only with national
media").
5. See Warren Fiske, Roger Keith Coleman Case; DNA Proves Executed Man Raped,
Killed Sister-in-law, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 13, 2006, at Al (recounting the Pope's
involvement); see also John F. Harris, Coleman Electrocuted as Final Appeals Fail; Supreme
Court Rejects Stay in 7 to 2 Vote, WASH. POST, May 21, 1992, at Al (reporting that Governor
Wilder "received more than 13,000 calls and letters on Coleman's case, many from overseas,
the vast majority urging clemency").
6. See Sandra Evans, Coleman Case Underscores Debate on Accuracy of Polygraphs,
WASH. POST, May 22, 1992, at C1 (reporting that the prominent criminal defense attorney F.
Lee Bailey had urged Governor Wilder to give Coleman a lie detector test, and that the results
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death approached, fifty television cameras and more than a dozen
satellite trucks, representing at least six different countries, were
stationed outside the prison while the Fuji blimp hovered overhead.'
Having refused to address the merits of Coleman's federal habeas
petition in 1991 because of a minor filing error Coleman's attorneys
committed,8 the U.S. Supreme Court declined Coleman's request for
a last-minute stay of execution.9 After Coleman was strapped into
the electric chair, he spoke his final words: "An innocent man is
going to be murdered tonight. When my innocence is proven, I hope
Americans will realize the injustice of the death penalty as all other
civilized countries have." ° Coleman was pronounced dead a few
minutes later.1'
In the years following Coleman's execution, many insisted that
Virginia had killed an innocent man. Kathleen Behan, one of
Coleman's attorneys, predicted that "Roger's innocence [would] be
proven"'2 and that "his case [would] be remembered as 'the Dred
Scott of death penalty law.""3 Led by James McCloskey, Centurion
Ministries worked tirelessly to prove that Coleman had neither
raped nor murdered his sister-in-law. 4 John C. Tucker, formerly a
criminal defense attorney in Chicago, joined those investigating
of the test had "helped sway" the Governor's decision to withhold clemency).
7. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 316; see also Peter Applebome, Virginia Executes Inmate
Despite Claim of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A20 (stating that "a legal and public
relations marathon ... brought the bespectacled former coal miner from obscurity to
international attention"); Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, Warner Orders DNA Testing in
Case of Man Executed in '92, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al (stating that Coleman
"maintained his innocence in a series of television and newspaper interviews that generated
attention around the world").
8. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727 (1991); see also infra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text (describing the filing error).
9. See Applebome, supra note 7 (describing the Court's final actions in Coleman's case).
10. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 328.
11. Id. at 329-30.
12. Harris, supra note 5.
13. Capital Punishment; Coleman's Supporters Seek To Prove Innocence, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 1992, at A3.
14. See James Dao, DNA Ties Man Executed in '92 to the Murder He Denied, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2006, at A14 (describing the involvement of McCloskey and his organization).
Centurion Ministries is a nonprofit organization based in New Jersey that investigates
claims of wrongful conviction. See Centurion Ministries, Inc. Home Page, http://www.
centurionministries.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (describing the organization and its
mission).
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Coleman's claim of innocence, and in 1997 presented the group's
findings in an engaging book titled May God Have Mercy: A True
Story of Crime and Punishment.5 In his book, Tucker presented
a painstaking review of the evidence and identified numerous
problems with the Commonwealth's case.16 Following up on rumors
that began to circulate even before Coleman was executed,' 7 Tucker
also presented plausible reasons to suspect that the man responsible
for McCoy's death might actually have been one of McCoy's next-
door neighbors.'"
Long after Coleman was killed, Edward Blake-a forensic
scientist who worked on Coleman's case-kept small samples of
semen taken from McCoy's body following her murder.19 Blake
hoped that DNA technology would one day permit a conclusive
determination of Coleman's guilt. Once Blake reported in the
summer of 2000 that the necessary technology was available,
Coleman's supporters and a variety of media organizations tried to
persuade Virginia officials to authorize new DNA tests to determine
whether Coleman was wrongly convicted.2' Four newspapers-the
Boston Globe, the Washington Post, the Virginian-Pilot, and the
Richmond Times-Dispatch-filed a lawsuit seeking to compel the
Commonwealth to approve a new round of DNA testing; but the
state courts refused, holding that the media had no legal entitle-
ment to have the tests performed.2 Those desiring the tests then
turned their attention to Virginia's Governor Mark Warner,
15. TUCKER, supra note 4.
16. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., TUCKER, supra note 4, at 232-33 (describing the highly publicized suspicion
that a man other than Coleman was the real perpetrator).
18. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
19. Maria Glod, Chance for Answer Secured in a Fridge; Scientist Guarded DNA in Va.
Case After '92 Execution, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at A10 (describing Blake's decision to
retain the evidence); see also John A. Farrell, Scientist Vows To Safeguard DNA in Va.
Murder Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2000, at Al (reporting Blake's contention that the
evidence belonged to him because it was his work product); Frank Green, Doctor Ready for
Va. Fight, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2002, at B1 (reporting Blake's determination
to keep the evidence for possible future testing absent a valid court order compelling him to
surrender it to state authorities).
20. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Va. 2002) (quoting a
letter from Blake dated July 26, 2000).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 811-13.
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relentlessly urging him to intervene.23 Shortly before leaving office
in early 2006, Governor Warner arranged for the tests to be
performed by a DNA laboratory in Toronto.24 Coleman's supporters
were thrilled, convinced that Coleman finally would be vindicated.25
Critics of capital punishment were equally elated, believing that
conclusive proof of Coleman's wrongful execution would greatly
bolster their efforts to abolish the death penalty.
2
On January 12, 2006, Virginia officials announced the results of
the DNA tests: the odds that semen found in McCoy's body came
from a man other than Coleman were approximately one in
nineteen million.27 Coleman, in other words, was guilty.
Reactions to the DNA test results were immediate and intense.
James McCloskey said that the news felt like "a kick in the stom-
ach"2 and that he was 'mystified' that Coleman had allowed so
23. See, e.g., Editorial, Dithering on DNA, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2004, at A18; Jerry
Markon, Warner Is Asked To Order DNA Test on Executed Man, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2003,
at B5; Editorial, Take Off the Blindfold in the Roger Coleman Case, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar.
6, 2003, at B8; Editorial, Test It Anyway, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2002, at A18; Editorial, Test It,
Mr. Warner, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2003, at A22; Editorial, Three More Reasons, WASH. POST,
June 16, 2003, at A22; Editorial, Warner Should Seek Coleman DNA Test, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Nov. 11, 2002, at B8; Editorial, Why Not Know?, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2003, at A20.
24. See Glod & Shear, supra note 7 (reporting Governor Warner's decision); see also A
Question of Guilt; Ontario Lab Will Decide if Virginia Executed a Coal Miner for a Murder He
Didn't Commit, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 8, 2006, at 13 (identifying the laboratory as the Centre
of Forensic Sciences).
25. See, e.g., Glod & Shear, supra note 7 (quoting James McCloskey as saying that "the
DNA tests will prove, once and for all, that Roger Coleman is a completely innocent man").
26. See Dao, supra note 14 (stating that many believed the DNA testing "would provide
powerful momentum to death penalty abolitionists if it were to prove that an innocent man
had been put to death"); Glod & Shear, supra note 7 (quoting a professor of criminal law who
predicted that, if the DNA tests exonerated Coleman, it could provide "the biggest turning
point in death penalty abolition"); Laurence Hammack, DNA Confirms Guilt, ROANOKE TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2006, at Al (stating that DNA testing in Coleman's case had long been "a potential
Holy Grail for opponents of the death penalty").
27. See Dao, supra note 14 (reporting Virginia officials' announcement that "a new DNA
test has found that [Coleman] was almost certainly the source of genetic material found in the
body of his murdered sister-in-law"); Hammack, supra note 26 (reporting that, according to
the DNA tests, the odds that the semen came from someone other than Coleman or one of his
blood relatives were one in nineteen million); Steve Mills, New DNA Tests Affirm Guilt of
Executed Man; Virginia Case a Blow to Death Penalty Foes, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2006, at Cll
(reporting that the DNA tests "show [Coleman] was, in fact, guilty of the rape and murder of
his sister-in-law").
28. Dao, supra note 14 (quoting McCloskey as saying that "[o]ur search for the facts can
delude us into thinking that what we have found is gold, only to discover that it is in fact fool's
gold").
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many people to believe in his innocence. ' 29 Tom Scott, one of
Coleman's prosecutors, told reporters that he was "euphoric"3 ° and
"felt like the weight of the entire world had been lifted from [his]
shoulders.' Peter Neufeld, cofounder of the Innocence Project,
urged people to remember that confirmation of Coleman's guilt did
not mean that all others facing execution were similarly guilty.
32
This Article relies on the extraordinary story of Roger Coleman's
case to draw important lessons about defects in the way that
procedurally flawed habeas petitions are adjudicated today. Part I
briefly tells the story of Coleman's conviction for the rape and
murder of Wanda McCoy. Part II.A describes the evidence that led
many to believe Coleman was innocent. Part II.B discusses the
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Coleman v. Thompson,33 in which
the Court seized on a minor procedural mistake made by Coleman's
attorneys and used it as an opportunity to overrule Fay v. Noia,34
the landmark case in which the Warren Court declared that
procedural errors inadvertently made during state court proceedings
had no bearing on a state prisoner's ability to secure federal habeas
relief.
Part III.A places the Court's ruling in Coleman in the context of
the Court's overarching campaign to reshape federal habeas law in
a manner that emphasizes the importance of achieving finality in
criminal cases. Part III.B, the heart of the Article, discusses the
near futility of attempting to achieve a genuine sense of finality in
criminal cases when the public believes that newly discovered
29. Mills, supra note 27. McCloskey also told reporters that he felt betrayed by Coleman
and that he did not understand how "somebody with such equanimity, such dignity, such
quiet confidence" could falsely proclaim his innocence moments before his execution.
Hammack, supra note 26.
30. Morning Edition: DNA Test Backs Up Verdict in 1992 Execution (NPR broadcast Jan.
13, 2006) (interview with Tom Scott).
31. Hammack, supra note 26.
32. See Fiske, supra note 5 (quoting Neufeld as saying that "[t]oday we got one answer,
and one man cannot speak for the correctness of verdicts in a thousand other capital cases").
The Innocence Project is a nonprofit legal clinic that was founded in 1992 at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law and that seeks to exonerate wrongly convicted individuals through
DNA testing. See About the Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.orglabout (last visited
Mar. 12, 2007); The Innocence Project, Mission, http://innocenceproject.orglabout/mission.php
(last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
33. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
34. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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evidence casts doubt on a prisoner's guilt. This Article contends
that, when the public feels it has good reason to suspect a prisoner
might be innocent, the Court is sorely mistaken in assuming that it
can achieve finality by dismissing the prisoner's habeas petition on
procedural grounds. Moreover, although the Court has long said it
will overlook a prisoner's procedural mistakes if the prisoner can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is innocent,
Coleman's case dramatically reveals that Americans grow deeply
uncomfortable about an execution or a term of imprisonment when
they are presented with far less exculpatory evidence than would be
sufficient to meet the Court's preponderance standard. The Article
contends that this is the "innocence gap" found in the United States
today-a gap between the amount of exculpatory evidence sufficient
to undercut finality by raising postconviction doubts in the mind of
the public, and the amount sufficient to persuade a federal court to
forgive a habeas petitioner's procedural mistakes and adjudicate the
merits of his or her constitutional claims. The Article concludes by
arguing that Congress is making the innocence gap even worse by
demanding, in a growing range of settings, that a federal court
dismiss a prisoner's procedurally flawed habeas petition unless the
prisoner can prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he or she
is innocent.
I. TRIAL IN GRUNDY
On March 10, 1981, in Grundy, Virginia, a small coal-mining
town on the western slopes of the Appalachian Mountains,35 Brad
McCoy returned home from work at around 11:15 p.m. to find
nineteen-year-old Wanda McCoy, his wife, murdered in their
home." McCoy's throat had been cut, she had been stabbed twice in
the chest, and she had been sexually assaulted. Investigators
quickly focused their attention on twenty-two-year-old Roger
Coleman, who lived less than two miles away, was married to
McCoy's sixteen-year-old sister, and had been convicted of at-
35. See TUCKER, supra note 4, at 3-7 (describing the geography and history of Grundy).
36. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307 S.E.2d 864, 865 (Va. 1983).
37. Id. at 866.
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tempted rape several years earlier.3" Following a month-long
investigation-during which Coleman served as one of McCoy's
pallbearers 39 -Coleman was arrested and charged with rape and
capital murder.40 Two local attorneys, neither of whom had ever
tried a murder case, were appointed to represent him.41
The Commonwealth presented its case at Coleman's trial in the
spring of 1982. The medical examiner testified that McCoy died
around 10:30 p.m.4 2 One of the lead detectives testified that there
were no signs of forced entry at McCoy's house, suggesting that the
attacker was one of only a handful of men whom McCoy knew and
would have allowed into her home late at night.43 Elmer Gist, Jr., a
forensic scientist, testified that hairs found on McCoy's body were
consistent with hairs taken from Coleman.44 Gist further testified
that Coleman was a secretor with Type B blood, placing him in a
small segment of the male population capable of producing the
semen found at the scene.45 Gist also stated that small amounts of
blood had been found on the pants Coleman was wearing the night
of the murder, and that the blood was Type 0, the same as McCoy's
blood.46 Investigators told the jury that Coleman's pants had gotten
wet on the bottom ten to twelve inches of each leg that night and
that Slate Creek, near McCoy's home, measured approximately ten
to twelve inches deep the following morning, suggesting that
perhaps Coleman waded across the creek when approaching or
fleeing McCoy's house.47 Other witnesses' testimony indicated that,
38. See TUCKER, supra note 4, at 19, 23-25, 33.
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id. at 55-56.
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id. at 70.
43. Id. at 72.
44. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Va. 1983).
45. See id. at 868. A "secretor" is a person whose blood type is revealed in other bodily
fluids, such as semen, saliva, and tears. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 867, 875-76. Long after the trial had ended, Coleman's supporters raised
questions about the likely accuracy of those measurements, contending that Coleman's pants
would have gotten much wetter if he had tried to wade across the fast-running creek. TUCKER,
supra note 4, at 68-69. When pressed, the lead investigator admitted that the creek had not
been measured the following morning and that he was mistaken when he testified to the
contrary at trial. Id. at 66. Coleman almost certainly did not wade across the creek that night
to reach or flee McCoy's house: in addition to getting his pants much wetter than they were,
2322 [Vol. 48:2313
KILLING ROGER COLEMAN
on the night McCoy was killed, there was a period of more than half
an hour, beginning at about 10:30 p.m., when Coleman had not been
seen by others.48 The prosecution closed with the testimony of Roger
Matney, a convicted felon who had been incarcerated with Coleman
in the county jail. Matney testified that Coleman had told him that
Coleman and another man sexually assaulted McCoy, and that the
other man killed her.49
Coleman testified in his own defense.5° In an effort to show that
he did not have time to rape and murder his sister-in-law, he
described his activities the night the crimes occurred. On Coleman's
account, he went to a store at about 9:00 p.m., drove to work at a
local coal mine, discovered that his shift had been canceled, talked
with co-workers and then with a friend until 10:30 p.m., picked up
an audio tape at another friend's house at 10:45 p.m. (a claim
inconsistent with the testimony of the friend, who placed Coleman's
brief visit at 10:20 p.m.), took a shower at 10:50 p.m. at a local
bathhouse frequently used by coal miners, and then arrived home
at 11:05 p.m.5 1 Coleman testified that he did not know why blood
had been found on his pants, but speculated that it might have come
from someone who had gotten cut while working with him at the
coal mine or from someone who had been scratched by his cat.52 He
said that his pants had probably gotten wet that night when he
approaching the house via the creek likely would have consumed time that Coleman could not
afford and would have required Coleman to park his vehicle on a public highway, where it
likely would have been seen by others. Id. at 68-69.
48. Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 868-69.
49. See id. at 868.
50. Id. at 869-70.
51. Id. Coleman's grandmother, with whom Coleman and his wife lived, similarly testified
that Coleman arrived home that night at about 11:05 p.m. Id. at 869. Initially, however, she
told investigators that he returned home at 11:30 p.m., just as the televised evening news was
ending-testimony that, if true, would have given Coleman a longer period of time in which
to clean up after the murder. See TUCKER, supra note 4, at 37. At trial, however, his
grandmother said that she had gotten things "mixed up" when she initially spoke with
investigators. Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 869. Although Coleman's wife initially told
investigators that Coleman arrived home at 11:05 p.m., she testified at trial (by which time
she had turned against Coleman) that she could not remember when he came home. TUCKER,
supra note 4, at 82-83.
52. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 84-85.
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went to the bathhouse and put his clothes on the floor of the
shower.5 He denied confessing his guilt to Matney.54
It did not take the jury long to reach its verdict. After only three-
and-a-half hours of deliberation, the jury declared Coleman guilty
of rape and murder.55
At the sentencing proceedings the following day, the prosecution
worked to establish that Coleman was eligible for the death penalty
both because he posed a continuing threat to society and because his
crimes had been "outrageously or wantonly vile."5 With respect to
the continuing threat that Coleman posed, a woman named Brenda
Rife testified that Coleman attempted to rape her in April 1977;
Rife's accusations had led to Coleman's conviction in July 1977 and
Coleman had been sentenced to three years in prison.57 Coleman
called two ministers to testify on his behalf, though neither man
knew Coleman well. 8 Coleman himself took the stand and said that
his fate was now "up to the Lord. 5 9 On March 19, less than twenty-
four hours after finding Coleman guilty of the underlying charges,
the jury returned with a recommendation that Coleman be exe-
cuted. ° The trial judge accepted the jury's recommendation the
following month."' On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed Coleman's conviction and sentence.6"
53. Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 870.
54. Id.
55. See TUCKER, supra note 4, at 87. After the jury retired to begin its deliberations, the
Commonwealth offered to give Coleman a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. His
attorneys encouraged him to accept the offer, but Coleman refused. Id. at 228.
56. Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 876 & n.4 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)).
57. Id. at 870-71. Coleman served approximately twenty months of that sentence. TUCKER,
supra note 4, at 25.
58. See Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 871.
59. Id.
60. See TUCKER, supra note 4, at 87-88.
61. See id. at 89.
62. Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 877. In his direct appeal, Coleman argued that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his request for a change of venue and when it admitted
certain photographs of McCoy's body, id. at 871-73; that the court erred when it admitted
statements Coleman made to investigators before he was given his Miranda warnings, id. at
872-73 (discussing the application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); that
investigators had exceeded the scope of Coleman's consent to a body search, id. at 874; that
prosecutors had improperly cross-examined Coleman regarding the blood found on his pants,
id. at 874-75; that the jury instructions had been improper, id. at 875; and that the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, id. at 875-
2324 [Vol. 48:2313
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II. QUESTIONING THE EVIDENCE, CLOSING THE COURTS
The mere fact that Coleman insisted he was innocent certainly
did not make his case unique. American prisons are full of individu-
als who claim they had nothing to do with the crimes of which they
were convicted. Some of those individuals undoubtedly are telling
the truth, but few of them win the same degree of national-indeed,
international-attention that Coleman drew in the months leading
up to his 1992 execution, and that he continued to draw in the years
after his death. 3
Apart from the unflagging energies of those convinced of
Coleman's innocence, two sets of forces helped to make Coleman's
case so compelling. First, the facts underlying Coleman's claim of
innocence were difficult to ignore. Second, many believed that the
U.S. Supreme Court's rationale for refusing to hear the merits of
Coleman's constitutional claims in 1991 represented an astonish-
ingly inhumane departure from the norms that had animated the
Court's habeas jurisprudence in earlier years.
A. The Case for Coleman's Innocence
Coleman's supporters based their belief in Coleman's innocence
on several key pieces of evidence. First, even on the Common-
wealth's own theory of the case, Coleman had less than forty-five
minutes to visit a friend, drive to the McCoys' house, gain access to
the home, rape and kill his sister-in-law, and then flee the scene
before Brad McCoy arrived home after his shift ended a short
distance away.' As James McCloskey would remark after release
of the damning DNA test results in January 2006, Coleman "had to
be a ninja to do it." 5
Second, Coleman's ability to commit those crimes within such a
narrow timeframe seemed even more unlikely once the pathologist
76. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected each of those contentions. Id. at 871-76.
63. See supra notes 3-8, 12-27 and accompanying text.
64. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 78, 247 (briefly describing the murder timelines set out by
both the prosecution and defense).
65. Mills, supra note 27.
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who performed McCoy's autopsy revealed that McCoy had been
subjected to both vaginal and anal intercourse, with semen found in
both locations.66 It seemed probable that two men, rather than one,
were responsible for McCoy's rape and murder. The Commonwealth,
however, never presented any evidence that Coleman acted with
another man. The two-assailant theory gained even more credence
when DNA tests performed in 1990-using DNA technology that
was more sophisticated than the technology available at the time of
Coleman's trial, but less sophisticated than the technology available
today-indicated that sperm from two different men had been
present in McCoy's body.67 Although the Commonwealth would later
suggest that McCoy's husband was the second source,6" Coleman's
supporters argued that it had been established earlier that Brad
and Wanda had not had sexual relations in the days prior to her
death.69 In the eyes of Coleman's advocates, the most plausible
theory was that McCoy had been attacked by two men, not one.
Third, in the estimation of the trial judge, the evidence that had
the most powerful effect on the jurors was Elmer Gist's testimony
about the similarities between hairs found on McCoy and hairs
taken from Coleman's body.7" Jurors had "exchanged glances and
settled back in their seats" after Gist stated that it was "possible,
but unlikely" that the hairs came from someone other than
Coleman.71 Yet Coleman's attorneys failed to tell the jury about
scientific studies indicating that such hair analyses were far from
precise."
66. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 49, 234-35.
67. See id. at 179-80, 199; see also id. at 179 (stating that, to Coleman's discredit, the tests
also placed Coleman within a very small segment of the male population-about two
percent-believed to be capable of producing the sperm). The DNA tests performed in January
2006 confirmed yet again that semen collected from McCoy's body had come from two different
men. Telephone Interview with John C. Tucker, Author of May God Have Mercy (Jan. 19,
2006).
68. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 205.
69. Id. at 180.
70. Id. at 75-76.
71. Id. at 76.
72. See id. at 77; Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair
Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 231 (1996) ("If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot
do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison
analysis should be excluded altogether from criminal trials.").
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Fourth, with respect to Roger Matney's account of Coleman's
alleged j ailhouse confession, Matney's mother-in-law told Coleman's
investigators that she had asked Matney about his testimony in
Coleman's case. Matney reportedly replied by saying, "[i]f you use
your head for something more than a hat rack, you can avoid a lot
ofjail time. 73 When she asked Matney whether Coleman really had
confessed to him, Matney reportedly stated that Coleman had not.74
Fifth, Coleman's supporters made much of the fact that, in a
report detailing his examination of the crime scene, the Common-
wealth's lead detective indicated that he saw a "pry mark" on the
molding around the house's front door. 75 This was significant
because it suggested that, contrary to the prosecution's theory,
McCoy might not have known her attacker (or attackers).76 The
detective later said that the mark easily could have been caused by
something other than a man trying to force his way into the house.77
But if it was indeed a "pry mark," as the detective initially said that
it was, this would help to undercut one of the Commonwealth's
theories for focusing the investigation on Coleman in the first
place-namely, that Coleman was one of the few men whom McCoy
knew and would have welcomed into her home.
Finally, numerous pieces of evidence suggested that the man
responsible for McCoy's rape and murder might have been Donald
Ramey, who lived with his brother and parents in the house directly
behind the McCoys. 7 A woman named Teresa Horn told Coleman's
team that Ramey attempted to sexually assault her in 1987 and
that, during the attack, he threatened to "do [her] like he did that
girl on Slate Creek., 79 Another woman told investigators that
Ramey sexually assaulted her in 1983.' Yet another woman said
73. TUCKER, supra note 4, at 131.
74. Id. Matney later denied making those statements and attributed his mother-in-law's
story to the fact that she had opposed her daughter's marriage to Matney. Id. at 204.
75. Id. at 31. The parties disputed whether this evidence had been properly provided to
Coleman's attorneys at the time of trial. Id. at 128, 130, 134.
76. See id. at 72, 247.
77. Id. at 182-83.
78. See id. at 148-49.
79. Id. at 148-51 (alteration in original). Ms. Horn died in March 1992 due to a drug
overdose, a death that some of Coleman's proponents regarded as a possible homicide. See id.
at 221-24.
80. Id. at 165-66.
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that Ramey threatened her with a knife and tried to sexually
assault her in 1982 or 1983.81 In the weeks prior to Coleman's
execution, others told Coleman's investigators that Ramey had
confessed to McCoy's murder.8 2 The day of Coleman's execution, a
woman named Pat Daniels reported that Ramey's mother came to
Daniels's hair salon soon after McCoy's death and said that, on the
night of the crime, her sons and husband got into a terrible
fight-the sons left the house and did not return until midnight, and
when they finally came home, "she could feel 'murder in the air."'8 3
In short, the evidence of Coleman's innocence was far from
negligible. Many feared that Virginia had sent an innocent man to
his grave-a possibility made even more unpalatable by the
reception Coleman received from the federal courts when he filed
his first petition for habeas relief.
B. The Consequences of Appealing One Day Late
By any reasonable account, Coleman's inexperienced, court-
appointed attorneys did a poor job of representing him at his trial.
They did not prepare well for crucial motions; they failed to
thoroughly investigate all of the available exculpatory evidence;
they presented a remarkably weak opening statement; and their
questioning of the witnesses was frequently unfocused and ineffec-
tive. 4 The efforts of Coleman's trial attorneys, however, are not
what made Coleman's case so notorious. Rather, the attorney-
created problem that would draw so much public scrutiny occurred
after Coleman began state post-conviction proceedings under the pro
bono representation of attorneys from Arnold & Porter, one of the
most prestigious firms in the nation.
In the fall of 1984, Coleman's new legal team filed papers in
Buchanan County's circuit court, seeking state post-conviction relief
on Coleman's behalf.85 They argued, among other things, that
81. Id. at 170-71.
82. Id. at 240-45. Many of these sources refused to sign affidavits accusing Ramey,
however, and some later recanted their accusations altogether--ostensibly out of fear for their
safety and that of their loved ones. See id. at 242, 244.
83. Id. at 308-09.
84. See id. at 59-60, 62-88 (describing Coleman's pretrial and trial representation).
85. Id. at 110-11.
[Vol. 48:23132328
KILLING ROGER COLEMAN
Coleman's trial attorneys failed to provide constitutionally adequate
representation, that the Commonwealth breached its constitutional
obligation to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence in its
possession, and that the trial judge should have granted Coleman
a change of venue.8 In an order signed on September 4, 1986, and
formally entered into the court's records on September 9, the court
denied Coleman's petition on the merits.8" The rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia gave Coleman thirty days to file his notice of
appeal.88 Apparently calculating the filing deadline from the date
the order was entered, rather than the date the order was signed,
Coleman's attorneys placed the notice of appeal in the mail on
October 6. The notice was received at the courthouse the following
day.89
The Commonwealth argued that the period for filing Coleman's
notice of appeal began to run on September 4, that the thirtieth day
after that date was October 4, a Saturday, and that the notice was
thus due the following Monday, October 6. They reasoned that
because the notice was not received until October 7, it was one day
late.9 ° In the view of the Commonwealth's attorneys, Coleman had
procedurally defaulted and his appeal had to be dismissed.9' In an
unpublished opinion dated May 19, 1987, apparently agreeing with
the Commonwealth's calculations, the Supreme Court of Virginia
dismissed Coleman's appeal in a brief, three-paragraph opinion.92
Innocuous though it might seem to a casual observer, the fact
that Coleman filed his notice of appeal one day late would have
tremendous consequences for his efforts to obtain habeas relief from
the federal courts. If the federal judiciary had still been operating
86. Id. at 110 (describing Coleman's petition for state post-conviction relief).
87. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727 (1991) (describing Coleman's failed effort to
secure state post-conviction relief); TUCKER, supra note 4, at 114.
88. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:9(a) (requiring that an appellant's notice of appeal be filed
"within 30 days after the entry of final judgment").
89. See TUCKER, supra note 4, at 114-15 (describing Arnold & Porter's handling of the
notice).
90. Id.
91. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727 (briefly recounting the Commonwealth's argument);
TUCKER, supra note 4, at 114-15 (providing additional details regarding the filing's timing).
92. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28 (reproducing the Supreme Court of Virginia's
unpublished opinion). Coleman's attorneys would later argue-to no avail-that the Supreme
Court of Virginia's ruling was not clearly based on state procedural grounds. See id. at 735-44
(rejecting this argument).
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under the rules laid down by the Warren Court in Fay v. Noia,93
Coleman would have had little to fear. In Fay, a New York prisoner
convicted of murder claimed that his confession was coerced and
that the trial court violated his federal due process rights when
it admitted that confession into evidence. 4 Because the prisoner
did not file a timely appeal after his trial, however, New York's
appellate courts refused to consider his federal constitutional
claim.95 When New York officials argued that the prisoner's proc-
edural default should also bar him from receiving federal habeas
relief, the Supreme Court vehemently disagreed. After describing
the "extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ" and its importance in
British and American history,' the Court broadly declared that a
federal court's habeas jurisdiction "is not defeated by anything
that may occur in the state court proceedings.""7 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, reasoned that "[slurely no fair-minded
person will contend that those who have been deprived of their
liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in
prison" simply because they inadvertently failed to obey a state's
procedural rules." The Court explained that a procedural default in
state proceedings could have adverse consequences for a federal
habeas petitioner only when the petitioner himself or herself, and
not merely his or her attorney, knew about the procedural rules'
requirements and deliberately decided to ignore them.99 Even then,
the Court held, the decision whether to dismiss the habeas petition
would be committed to the discretion of the federal judge. 100
Between the time Fay was decided in 1963 and the time Roger
Coleman sought habeas relief in the late 1980s, the Court slowly
chipped away at Fay by increasingly deferring to states' procedural
rules. In Francis v. Henderson,'0' for example, the Court held that
a state prisoner ordinarily cannot obtain habeas relief based on the
93. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
94. Id. at 394-95.
95. Id. at 395-96.
96. Id. at 399-426.
97. Id. at 426.
98. Id. at 441.
99. See id. at 438-39.
100. See id.
101. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
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illegal composition of the grand jury that indicted him, if the
prisoner failed to obey a state rule requiring that all grand jury
challenges be raised before trial. °2 In Wainwright v. Sykes,03 the
Court similarly held that, if a prisoner failed to obey a state's
contemporaneous-objection rule, which requires that evidentiary
objections be made in a timely fashion at trial, then the prisoner
ordinarily cannot obtain habeas relief based on that evidence's
unlawful admission.0 4 While 'leav[ing] for another day" the
question of whether Fay remained good law for untimely appeals, 0 5
the Sykes Court declared that, like the state procedural rule at issue
in Francis, a state's "contemporaneous-objection rule ... deserves
greater respect than Fay gives it, both for the fact that it is em-
ployed by a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system and for
the many interests which it serves in its own right."'"
Coleman's habeas petition required the Court to confront the
question it had avoided in Sykes-namely, whether Fay's forgiving
standard would continue to apply to prisoners who failed to file
timely appeals during state proceedings. Coleman's habeas petition
articulated eleven different claims, four of which Coleman's trial
attorneys had properly raised on direct appeal, but seven of which
(including, most notably, his claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial) he raised for the first time in state
post-conviction proceedings-proceedings that now were clouded by
his pro bono attorneys' failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 10 7
Both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit refused to hear the seven claims Coleman raised
for the first time in state post-conviction proceedings, holding that
Sykes, rather than Fay, provided the governing law. 108 "Even in a
capital case," the Fourth Circuit wrote, "procedural default justifies
102. Id. at 541-42.
103. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
104. See id. at 81-88.
105. Id. at 88 n.12.
106. Id. at 88.
107. See Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1990) (describing Coleman's
first federal habeas petition), affid, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Under Virginia law, Coleman was
required to wait until state post-conviction proceedings to claim that his trial counsel's
performance had been deficient. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991).
108. See Coleman, 895 F.2d at 142-44 (describing the district court's unpublished reasoning
and affirming the lower court ruling).
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a federal habeas court's refusal to address the merits of the
defaulted claims."'10 9
Writing for the Court in Coleman v. Thompson, Justice O'Connor
opened with a sentence that could not have been more ominous for
Coleman: "This is a case about federalism." 10 The Court stated that,
although the writ of habeas corpus is an important remedy for
unlawful detentions, it also forces the states to incur "significant
costs.""' Hoping to make those costs less onerous, the Court
declared that the time had come to overrule Fay and adopt a new,
overarching standard governing the availability of federal habeas
relief in all cases involving procedural defaults in prior state
proceedings:
We now make it explicit: In all cases in which a state prisoner
has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an
independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas
review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demon-
strate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of
the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure
to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice. Fay was based on a conception of federal/state
relations that undervalued the importance of state procedural
rules.... We now recognize the important interest in finality
served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the
States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect
them.
112
The Court stated that an attorney's mistake in state post-
conviction litigation--even if that mistake is grossly negligent-is
not "cause" sufficient to excuse a procedural default." 3 Even in
capital cases, a prisoner is not constitutionally entitled to the
assistance of an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings;"
4
109. Id. at 143 (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986)).
110. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726.
111. Id. at 747-48 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982)).
112. Id. at 750.
113. See id. at 752-54.
114. Id. at 752 (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987)). But see Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel
in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1079 (2006) (arguing that,
in fact, there is a constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings).
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consequently, the Court concluded, a prisoner seeking state post-
conviction relief must personally bear the risk of attorney error.115
Although it would have been a long shot, Coleman's attorneys
could have argued that the thirty-day rule was not an "adequate
state procedural rule" because, as applied in Coleman's case-a case
where Coleman had filed a document just one day late, under
circumstances where calculating the filing deadline was possibly
confusing and where the document was of a nature that the Court
itself described as "purely ministerial" 6-- the rule did not serve
legitimate state interests."7 In their petition for certiorari, however,
Coleman's attorneys did not question the state interests purportedly
served by the rule's application to Coleman."1 Nor did Coleman's
attorneys argue that refusing to hear Coleman's procedurally
defaulted claims would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice.""' 9 As a result, the Court held, Coleman was ineligible for
habeas relief on each and every one of his seven procedurally
defaulted claims. 2
0
Coleman's fate was sealed. As the day of his execution drew near,
Coleman filed a second habeas petition, in which he argued that he
was actually innocent of McCoy's rape and murder and that denying
115. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-54. But see The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading
Cases, 105 HARV. L. REv. 177, 336-37 (1991) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (arguing that the
Coleman Court's reasoning on this point was based on a mistaken understanding of the
Court's own precedent).
116. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 742.
117. Cf. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 366-67 (2002) (holding that a prisoner's failure to obey
a state procedural rule requiring that a motion for a continuance be made in writing, rather
than merely orally, was not an "adequate" state ground precluding federal review because no
legitimate state interests were served by the rule's application in the case at bar).
118. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 744 ("Coleman contends ... that the procedural bar was not
adequate to support the judgment. Coleman did not petition for certiorari on this question
119. Id. at 757 ("Coleman does not argue in this Court that federal review of his claims is
necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice."). See generally Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) ("[Wle think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
default."). Although Coleman's attorneys did not make this argument before the Court, they
had made that argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
and the Fourth Circuit rejected it in a four-sentence discussion of the facts. See Coleman v.
Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 1990), affd, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). For a detailed
discussion of the miscarriage-of-justice exception, see infra Part III.B.
120. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757 (summarizing the Court's holding).
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him habeas relief would thus result in a miscarriage of justice. 121
Eight days before Coleman's execution, however, the district court
dismissed Coleman's last-minute request, finding that he had not
made "even a colorable showing of 'actual innocence."'122 Six days
later, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished, two-paragraph
opinion. 12 Just minutes before Coleman was electrocuted, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy communicating from
a late-night dinner with the President and others at the Canadian
embassy,124 the Supreme Court denied Coleman's request that the
Court stay his execution pending review of the Fourth Circuit's
ruling.12
The Court's dramatic rejection of Fay, in a case involving a
document filed just one day late by a death-row inmate whom many
feared was innocent, certainly did not escape notice. 126 Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens filed a powerfully worded dissent,
accusing their colleagues in the majority of continuing the Court's
"crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state
prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims" and
of "creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and
unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights.1 27
In blistering editorials, the New York Times and the Boston
121. Coleman v. Thompson, 798 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (W.D. Va. 1992).
122. Id. at 1217.
123. See Coleman v. Thompson, No. 92-4005, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 11440 (4th Cir. May
18, 1992).
124. See Applebome, supra note 7.
125. See Coleman v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 188 (1992) (per curiam).
126. The Washington Post and the New York Times, for example, prominently featured
detailed accounts of the Court's ruling, emphasizing that Coleman's notice of appeal had
missed the deadline only by one day and that the Court's decision would have significant
consequences for all habeas petitioners whose attorneys made inadvertent errors in state
court proceedings. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Again Curbs Federal Appeals by State
Inmates; 1963 Decision Reversed; Almost Any Failure To Follow States' Rules Will Forfeit
Right to U.S. Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,1991, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Tardiness Bars Appeal
from Death Row; New Hurdle Blocks Federal Court Access, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at A5.
127. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 17-18
(1992) (stating that the Court's ruling in Coleman was a "blatant exercise of law-making
power marching under the banner of federalism" and that the Court "completely rewrote the
procedural rules governing post-conviction proceedings to foreclose judicial review of even
meritorious constitutional claims in capital cases"); see also Leading Cases, supra note 115,
at 338 ("Forcing these possibly innocent people to serve long prison sentences or face
execution because of their attorneys' incompetence is unjust.").
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Globe agreed. The Times called the ruling "bizarre," saying that
it had "produced a terrible injustice" and was based on "a
cramped distortion of federalism's scheme of justice under the
Constitution.""12 The Globe described the decision as "perversef,"
"cavalierE," and "moral[ly] bankrupto"; it condemned the Court
for "penaliz[ing Coleman] for a mistake of his lawyers"; and it
concluded that "[t]he role of the federal courts as a last recourse in
the nation's judicial system is contorted and diminished by the
ruling."'129 In its cover story two days before Coleman's execution,
Time magazine stated that "the courts have so far failed Coleman
miserably," that Coleman was "the victim of a justice system so bent
on streamlining procedures and clearing dockets that the question
of whether or not he actually murdered Wanda McCoy has become
a subsidiary consideration," and that "the Supreme Court seems
more concerned with finality than fairness.' ' °
The Court's actions also drew the attention of John Tucker. It was
the Coleman decision that inspired him to investigate Coleman's
claim of innocence' 3' and write the book that eventually would help
persuade Virginia's Governor Warner to order new DNA tests in
January 20061'32-tests that, to the astonishment of Coleman's
advocates and the relief of Virginia officials, would confirm that
Coleman had indeed raped and murdered Wanda McCoy twenty-five
years earlier.
III. THE ILLUSION OF FINALITY IN CASES OF SUSPECTED INNOCENCE
A. The New Emphasis on Finality
When Roger Coleman's federal habeas petition prompted the
Supreme Court to declare that it "now recognize[d] the important
interest in finality served by state procedural rules,""' those who
128. Editorial, Federalism, Despoiled, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1991, at A28.
129. Editorial, Contorting the Federal Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1991, at 22.
130. Smolowe, supra note 3, at 42.
131. Telephone Interview with John C. Tucker, supra note 67.
132. See Thomas Frisbie, Chicago Lawyer's 1997 Book Faces a New Plot Twist: DNA To
Determine Guilt of Book Subject, Executed in '92, CHi. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at A12
(reporting that James McCloskey, of Centurion Ministries, believed Tucker's book helped
convince Governor Warner to order the tests); see also supra notes 19-32 and accompanying
text (describing the results of the 2006 tests).
133. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also supra text accompanying
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closely followed the Court's habeas rulings could not have been
surprised. The writings of two men-Professor Paul M. Bator, of the
Harvard Law School, and Judge Henry M. Friendly, of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-had already begun
to push the Court toward imposing new restrictions on the availabil-
ity of federal habeas relief, with the aim of helping the states more
rapidly achieve finality in their criminal cases.
In a 1963 article in the Harvard Law Review, Bator urged the
Court to place the need for finality at the very heart of its habeas
jurisprudence by sharply limiting prisoners' ability to relitigate
issues that they were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate in
prior state proceedings.' 34 Seven years later, in an article "draw[ing]
heavily" from Bator's work, Friendly reemphasized the importance
of finality and argued that, with only limited exceptions, the Court
should restrict habeas relief to those prisoners who--in addition to
raising meritorious constitutional claims---could make a "colorable
claim of innocence."'35 Believing that state prisoners were finding it
too easy to drag the states through frivolous and repetitious federal
habeas litigation, 3 ' Bator and Friendly identified numerous reasons
that federal courts should be reluctant to allow habeas petitioners
to challenge their convictions or sentences after the completion of
direct review. Achieving finality in criminal cases is necessary, they
argued, in order to conserve scarce judicial resources; 37 preserve the
note 112.
134. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451-63 (1963); see also James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next
Time? The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1997, 2041 (1992) ("Professor Bator's article now dominates habeas corpus jurisprudence and
scholarship."). Bator wrote his article in response to the Court's habeas-expanding ruling in
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See Bator, supra, at 463-523 (providing a detailed
historical analysis of habeas corpus jurisdiction and critique of Brown).
135. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142, 146 n.15 (1970); see also Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 939, 943 (1991) (noting some of the ways in which Bator's and Friendly's
articles have been "extremely influential").
136. See Bator, supra note 134, at 444 (stating his intent to challenge the prevailing
wisdom that a state prisoner should "automatically obtain federal district court collateral
review of the merits of all federal ... questions, no matter how fully and fairly these have been
litigated in the state-court system"); Friendly, supra note 135, at 143-44 (noting an
exponential increase in habeas corpus petitions in the seventeen years following the decision
in Brown v. Allen, and suggesting that a large proportion of the habeas cases filling federal
courts' dockets were repetitious and frivolous).
137. See Bator, supra note 134, at 451; Friendly, supra note 135, at 148-49.
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morale of state judges by assuring them that their decisions will
not be second-guessed routinely by their federal counterparts;138
reinforce the deterrent function of the law by making it clear that
violators will face prompt and certain punishment;139 bolster the
rehabilitative function of incarceration by helping prisoners shift
their focus from winning release to improving their own lives and
conduct;14 ensure that a case's relevant facts are adjudicated at a
time when events are still vivid in witnesses' memories;' 4 ' and
permit citizens eventually to enjoy a sense of "[riepose" in each
criminal case prosecuted in their names-a sense "that we have
tried hard enough and thus may take it that justice has been
done."'42
When Coleman's petition for certiorari arrived at the Court in the
fall of 1990, Bator's and Friendly's arguments had already achieved
results. 43 In Stone v. Powell,1'4 for example, the Court largely
foreclosed the possibility of federal habeas relief for prisoners who
allege that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
was admitted at their trials.'45 Similarly, in a plurality opinion later
138. See Bator, supra note 134, at 451 ("I could imagine nothing more subversive of a
judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential
a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the
notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else."); see also Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (quoting this passage); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-
29 n.33 (1982) (same).
139. See Bator, supra note 134, at 452.
140. See id.; Friendly, supra note 135, at 146.
141. See Friendly, supra note 135, at 147-48; see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 384 (1964) (stating that both
state and federal collateral review pose a threat to the reliable adjudication of facts).
142. Bator, supra note 134, at 452; see Friendly, supra note 135, at 149 (stating that habeas
law should accommodate "the human desire that things must sometime come to an end").
143. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (stating that, among other
things, achieving finality in criminal cases reinforces the law's deterrent effects and ensures
that facts are conclusively decided at a time when witnesses' memories are still fresh);
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that finality is necessary in order to preserve the law's deterrent
and rehabilitative functions, conserve resources, and spare states from having to retry cases
after witnesses' memories have faded).
144. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
145. See id. at 481-82 (holding that habeas relief would be available for such a claim only
if the petitioner had not had an opportunity to litigate the claim in prior state proceedings);
see also Friendly, supra note 135, at 161 ("[Mly proposal would almost always preclude
collateral attack on claims of illegal search and seizure."); Patchel, supra note 135, at 961
('The Stone holding results from an amalgam of Friendly's focus on innocence and Bator's test
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approved by a majority of the Court, Justice O'Connor concluded in
Teague v. Lane146 that "underlying considerations of finality" of the
sort outlined by Bator and Friendly weighed strongly in favor of
limiting the retroactive application of new rules of constitutional
law to cases on collateral review.'47 As previously noted, the Court
was also steadily distancing itself from Fay v. Noia's forgiving
stance toward violations of states' procedural rules.
48
When the Court declared in Coleman that it intended to show
greater respect for states' procedural requirements and the desire
for finality that animates those requirements, 49 therefore, the Court
was clearly in pursuit of an overarching, finality-driven reform
agenda. The Court determined that Virginia's thirty-day deadline
for filing notices of appeal was intended "to set a definite point of
time when litigation should be at an end, unless within that time
the prescribed [notice of appeal] has been made; and if it has not
been, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the
appellant's demands."' 0 If a prisoner could not show good cause for
his failure to abide by the Commonwealth's rule, and if he could not
demonstrate that failing to consider the merits of his constitutional
claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, then
the Court concluded that it should help the Commonwealth achieve
finality by foreclosing the possibility of federal habeas relief.'
Bator's and Friendly's arguments bore fruit in other cases as well,
both in the same Term that the Court decided Coleman and in the
years immediately thereafter.'52 In McCleskey v. Zant,'53 decided two
for finality.").
146. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
147. See id. at 309-10 (plurality opinion). A majority of the Court adopted the Teague
plurality's analysis in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989); see also O'Dell v.
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997) (explaining the proper way to conduct the Teague
analysis).
148. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
149. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); supra note 112 (quoting
Coleman).
150. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 751 (quoting Browder v. Director, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)).
151. Id. at 757.
152. In addition to the cases cited above, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635-37
(1993) (finding that states have a strong "interest in the finality of convictions that have
survived direct review within the state court system," and holding that, to obtain federal
habeas relief for a constitutional error that occurred at trial, a petitioner must demonstrate
"actual prejudice" resulting from that error).
153. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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months prior to Coleman, the Court cited finality as a basis for
imposing new restrictions on prisoners' ability to file successive or
abusive federal habeas petitions." Following Friendly's lead, the
McCleskey Court stressed that the new limits on successive and
abusive petitions would not apply in those "extraordinary instances"
in which a prisoner could make a showing of innocence sufficiently
persuasive to demonstrate that failing to entertain his or her
constitutional claims would result in "a fundamental miscarriage
of justice."55 In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,56 decided the following
Term, the Court reiterated that "[t]he writ [of habeas corpus] strikes
at finality of a state criminal conviction,"' 7 and declared that
habeas petitioners who failed to develop the facts underlying their
constitutional claims in prior state proceedings ordinarily would not
be granted a federal evidentiary hearing.'58 An exception would be
made, however, if a prisoner could demonstrate that failing to hold
an evidentiary hearing would result in a "fundamental miscarriage
of justice."'5 9 In its 1993 ruling in Herrera v. Collins,160 the Court
stated that "the need for finality in capital cases" should make the
federal courts exceedingly reluctant to adjudicate a death row
inmate's freestanding claim of actual innocence.' 6 '
154. See id. at 490-91. A "successive" habeas petition is one in which a prisoner "raises
grounds identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition." Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion). An "abuse of the writ" is a habeas
petition in which a prisoner "rais[es] grounds that were available but not relied upon in a
prior petition, or engages in other conduct" that leads a court to think the prisoner should be
disqualified from seeking habeas relief. Id. Both kinds of petitions are primarily governed
today by federal legislation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000); see also infra notes 222-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the statute).
155. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95. McCleskey sent ambiguous signals with respect to
how persuasive the prisoner's proof of innocence would have to be, indicating at one point that
a prisoner would have to demonstrate that he or she was "probably" innocent, id. at 494, then
indicating two paragraphs later that the prisoner would have to make a "colorable showing
of factual innocence," id. at 495 (quoting Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454). The Court's statements
on the matter were dicta, however, because the Court ultimately concluded that the evidence
and issues Warren McCleskey had placed before the Court had no tendency to demonstrate
that he was innocent. See id. at 502-03. For a more detailed discussion of the standard of proof
for the miscarriage-of-justice exception, see infra Part III.B.2.
156. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
157. Id. at 7.
158. See id. at 10-12.
159. Id. at 12. The Keeney Court did not elaborate on the requirements a prisoner would
have to meet in order to qualify for the exception. See id. at 11-12.
160. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
161. Id. at 417; see also infra notes 213, 215 and accompanying text (discussing Herrera).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:2313
B. The Innocence Gap
1. The Elusiveness of Finality
No one can dispute that finality is a value that both the Court
and Congress ought to consider when determining the conditions
under which federal habeas relief will be available. Judicial
resources are indeed scarce; the morale of state judges should not
be needlessly undermined; the law's deterrent and rehabilitative
functions are important; facts are optimally determined when the
evidence is freshest; and the system serves a repose-seeking
citizenry well when it gives citizens good cause to believe that the
actors in a criminal case have done their best to do justice, and that
the time has come to move on.'62 For those cases in which the public
believes it has reason to suspect the Court has convicted a prisoner
of a crime he or she did not commit, however, the Court has done a
poor job of shaping its habeas jurisprudence in a manner that will
effectively secure finality and its benefits.'63
162. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text (presenting these arguments); see also
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as
a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but
tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh
litigation on issues already resolved."); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline
of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 640 (1991)
(reciting finality's benefits).
163. The Court's emphasis on finality has already been the target of criticism. See, e.g.,
Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485,
491-92 (1995) (lamenting that "[flinality and federalism, preservation of judicial resources,
and fairness-in that order-are the priorities the Court has set for itself'); Patchel, supra
note 135, at 1025-62 (identifying numerous costs associated with a habeas regime built on a
desire to achieve finality). Professor Friedman has argued, for example, that even if one
accepts that finality is as important as the Court says that it is, the Court has done a poor job
of achieving it. He charges that the Court's habeas reforms "have generated unwarranted
doctrinal complexity, directed judicial inquiry from the merits to procedural issues, produced
uncertainty, and increased litigation-all to the detriment of finality." Friedman, supra, at
485. Coleman's case illustrates Friedman's point. In Coleman's federal habeas proceedings,
attorneys representing both Coleman and the Commonwealth devoted countless hours to
constructing arguments aimed not at the merits of Coleman's constitutional claims, but rather
at procedural questions: whether Coleman filed his notice of appeal on time in his state post-
conviction proceedings, whether the Supreme Court of Virginia relied on Coleman's late filing
when it dismissed his request for post-conviction relief, and whether Coleman's late filing
necessitated the dismissal of his federal habeas petition. See supra notes 107-20 and
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The Justices appear to believe that achieving finality in any given
case is the almost inevitable consequence of foreclosing the possibil-
ity of federal habeas relief, and that one's only task when shaping
habeas law is thus to determine how the need for finality stacks up
against objectives that weigh in favor of making habeas relief
available. If the Court believes that finality outweighs the compet-
ing values in a particular case, then it closes the doors of the federal
courthouse; if it believes finality must give way to other concerns,
then it leaves the doors open. In either case, the Court treats
finality as the predictable result of refusing to consider the merits
of a prisoner's federal habeas petition.
As the twenty-five-year story of Roger Coleman's case'64 poi-
gnantly demonstrates, however, the Court has significantly over-
estimated the extent to which a rapid denial of habeas relief on
procedural grounds can assure a state and its citizens of finality
when there is reason to suspect that the prisoner might be innocent.
When citizens have cause to question a prisoner's guilt, notwith-
standing the prisoner's prior conviction by a jury of his or her peers,
a genuine sense of repose is far more elusive than the Court has
acknowledged, the deterrent and rehabilitative functions of the law
are not easily advanced, and the state's financial and judicial
resources may be repeatedly spent on litigation brought by organi-
zations and individuals who are determined to come to the pris-
accompanying text (discussing Coleman's habeas litigation). The Coleman Court's decision to
overrule Fay did clear up one matter: we now know that, as a general rule, all state
procedural defaults are fatal in federal habeas proceedings. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text (discussing Coleman's rejection of Fay). But the Court's ruling simply
redirects parties' energies to a new set of complex procedural questions: whether a state's
procedural rules serve legitimate state interests and thus are "adequate" to foreclose habeas
review, and, if so, whether a habeas petitioner can qualify for an exception to the ban on
procedurally defaulted claims either by showing good cause for his or her failure to abide by
the state's procedural rules or by persuading the court that refusing to consider the merits of
his or her constitutional claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See
supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (identifying these exceptions); infra Part III.B.2
(discussing the miscarriage-of-justice exception in greater detail). After examining the entire
sweep of the Court's habeas reforms, Friedman concludes that, "[d]espite the high priority the
Court has accorded the value of finality, there still is not much good to be said about the
Court's efforts to achieve it. Procedural litigation may simply have replaced substantive
litigation." Friedman, supra, at 534.
164. See supra notes 1-32 and accompanying text (discussing the twenty-five-year story of
Coleman's case).
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oner's aid.165 Indeed, far from securing finality and reinforcing a
state's legal regime, the perceived moral authority of the criminal
justice system is compromised, and the public's confidence in the
courts tested, when judges refuse to consider a prisoner's legal
claims notwithstanding the prisoner's presentation of significant
evidence that he or she might actually be innocent.
In the final eight days of Coleman's life, both the district court
and the Fourth Circuit quickly processed Coleman's final habeas
petition, and the Supreme Court rejected his last-minute request
for a stay of execution.166 Both the district court and the Supreme
Court began their analyses by disparagingly noting that Coleman
had already petitioned the courts for relief twelve times before.167
The courts' rapid-fire efforts to terminate Coleman's judicial pro-
ceedings, however, did little to bring a sense of closure to Coleman's
case. If anything, the speed with which the courts disposed of
Coleman's final arguments, and the courts' continued refusal to
consider the merits of his claims, only fed the perception that a man
whose constitutional rights may have been violated, and whose guilt
remained in question, was being pushed relentlessly toward the
electric chair, and the federal courts were refusing to do anything
about it, based on his attorneys' minor filing error.'68 The courts
surely would have achieved a much greater sense of finality if they
had simply agreed to adjudicate the merits of Coleman's constitu-
tional claims. Federal adjudication of those claims would not have
resolved the public's doubts about Coleman's guilt, but it would
have addressed the public's fear that one of the chief reasons
Coleman was on death row in the first place was that the Common-
wealth of Virginia had violated his constitutional rights.
165. See supra notes 1-26 and accompanying text (discussing how a multitude of
organizations, people, and the news media came to Coleman's aid and compelled government
action).
166. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (recounting those proceedings).
167. See Coleman v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 188, 188 (1992) (per curiam) (beginning by stating
that "this is now the 12th round of judicial review in a murder case which began 11 years
ago"); Coleman v. Thompson, 798 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (W.D. Va. 1992) (beginning the court's
analysis with the same observation).
168. In her cover story for Time magazine dated May 18, 1992, for example, Jill Smolowe
stated that "the courts have so far failed Coleman miserably" and that Coleman was "the
victim of a justice system so bent on streamlining procedures and clearing dockets that the
question of whether or not he actually murdered Wanda McCoy has become a subsidiary
consideration." Smolowe, supra note 3, at 42.
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Not even Coleman's execution brought the sense of finality that
the Court said it coveted on the Commonwealth's behalf.169 "Repose,"
in the sense that Bator and Friendly used the term, 7 ° is hardly the
word one would choose to describe the state of affairs as the hour of
Coleman's electrocution drew near. To the contrary, the interna-
tional media scrutiny of Coleman's conviction and execution, the
investigations that for many years fueled fears that Virginia may
have executed an innocent man, and the litigation and public
appeals that eventually culminated in Governor Warner's decision
to order a final round of DNA tests-twenty-five years after Wanda
McCoy's death-all powerfully demonstrate that finality is excep-
tionally difficult to achieve in the face of reasonable suspicions of
innocence.17' Genuine finality was not achieved in Coleman's case
until January 2006, when new DNA tests showed that there was
only a one-in-nineteen-million chance that semen recovered from
the scene of McCoy's murder came from a man other than Roger
Coleman, and the "weight of the entire world" was finally lifted from
the shoulders of Coleman's prosecutors.172 If a conscientious forensic
scientist had not insisted on keeping DNA samples long after the
courts tried to put the case to rest,'73 Grundy would continue to be
the focus of rumors and suspicions today.
169. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's goal of finality).
170. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 1-26 and accompanying text (discussing the events mentioned).
172. Hammack, supra note 26; see supra note 31 and accompanying text. To my mind, the
only question that remains in Coleman's case is the identity of the second source of sperm
found in McCoy's body. The 2006 DNA tests reconfirmed the presence of sperm from two men,
see supra note 67 and accompanying text, but the second source still has not been identified.
The Commonwealth has long claimed that McCoy's husband was the second source. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text. As John Tucker said in a telephone interview, it is indeed
exceptionally difficult to imagine that Coleman was able to join the company of another man
and jointly carry out the terrible crimes in the exceptionally short window of time that was
available. Nor is it apparent, in the small town of Grundy, that there was anyone Coleman
knew who would have been willing to commit those acts with him. Telephone Interview with
John C. Tucker, supra note 67. Nevertheless, if the trial testimony of convicted felon Roger
Matney were to be believed, Coleman did confess to his cellmate that he and another man
carried out the crimes together. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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2. The Poorly Calibrated Miscarriage-of-Justice Exception
One might expect to find the tension between finality and
suspected innocence resolved by the Court's repeated assurances
that, when refusing to adjudicate a habeas petitioner's constitu-
tional claims would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice,"
the Court will make an exception to its tough stance against
prisoners' procedural failings.'74 If properly framed and calibrated,
the miscarriage-of-justice exception could ensure that procedural
mistakes would not foreclose a merits-focused adjudication of a
prisoner's constitutional claims when dismissing the prisoner's
petition on procedural grounds would do little to advance the cause
of finality. As it has taken shape over the past twenty years,
however-first at the hands of the Court, and then more recently at
the hands of Congress-the miscarriage-of-justice exception has
become woefully inadequate to ensure that, when doubts about a
prisoner's guilt will thwart finality, the federal courts will consider
the merits of the prisoner's procedurally flawed habeas petition. In
short, there is a sizable "innocence gap" today-a gap between the
amount of exculpatory evidence sufficient to undermine finality and
the amount sufficient to trigger the federal courts' willingness to
forgive a prisoner's procedural mistakes and address the merits of
his or her constitutional claims.
a. The Court's Original Formulation
In his influential 1970 article, Judge Friendly proposed that the
Court restrict habeas relief to those prisoners who are able to
make a "colorable claim of innocence."'75 Elaborating only briefly on
what he meant by that phrase, Friendly argued that, with limited
exceptions, a habeas petitioner should be required to
show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard
to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have
been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the
174. See supra notes 112, 155-59 and accompanying text.
175. Friendly, supra note 135, at 142.
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trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable
doubt of his guilt.7 '
Friendly's proposal found its first stirrings of life in two decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court on the same day in 1986. In
Kuhlmann v. Wilson,7 ' a plurality of the Court endorsed using
Friendly's standard to identify those instances in which a prisoner
would be permitted to bring a successive habeas petition seeking
to relitigate a constitutional claim that had been adjudicated and
rejected in prior federal habeas proceedings. 7 ' The plurality
believed that, in those circumstances, Friendly's standard would
strike the appropriate balance between the state's interest in
finality and the prisoner's interest in achieving "the ends of
justice."'79 In Murray v. Carrier,"s after focusing primarily on what
might constitute "cause" sufficient to excuse a habeas petitioner's
procedural default,' 8 ' the Court noted in dictum that there might be
occasions in which it would agree to adjudicate a prisoner's proce-
durally defaulted claims even if the prisoner failed to justify his or
her violation of the state's procedural rules.'82 "[W]e think," the
Court wrote, "that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in
the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.'8 3
Friendly's formulation of the standard of proof, endorsed by the
Kuhlmann plurality, appeared less demanding than the standard
articulated in Carrier: Friendly spoke of a "colorable claim" and of
a "fair probability,"'" while Carrier spoke of an outright prob-
ability.' Despite those differences, however, both Kuhlmann and
Carrier signaled the Court's inclination to respond sensibly when
confronted with doubts about a prisoner's guilt.
176. Id. at 160.
177. 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion).
178. See id. at 452-54.
179. Id. at 451-54.
180. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
181. See id. at 485-97.
182. See id. at 495-96.
183. Id. at 496.
184. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 & n.17 (citing Friendly, supra note 135, at 160).
185. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.
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For several years, it appeared that Kuhlmann and Carrier
established the parameters for framing the miscarriage-of-justice
exception."8 6 The analytic possibilities became more complex,
however, when the Court issued its 1992 ruling in Sawyer v.
Whitley.8 ' In Sawyer, a death row inmate filed a successive habeas
petition alleging that his sentencing proceedings were infected by
constitutional error. 1" The prisoner did not argue that he was
actually innocent of the murder of which he had been convicted.
Rather, he argued that his eligibility for the death penalty had been
unconstitutionally determined and that refusing to adjudicate the
merits of his second petition would thus result in a miscarriage of
justice." 9 The Court declared that it would not consider the merits
of the prisoner's second petition unless the prisoner could "show by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable state law."190
After Sawyer, it was not clear which standard of proof the courts
would apply when habeas petitioners sought to avoid procedural
obstacles by claiming they were innocent of the crimes of which they
were convicted: the standards variously described in Kuhlmann
and Carrier, which would require, at most, a showing of probable
innocence, or the more demanding standard applied in Sawyer,
where the prisoner was required to make the requisite showing by
"clear and convincing evidence." The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded, for example, that Sawyer provided the standard
for all applications of the miscarriage-of-justice exception.' 9 ' The
issue would remain in doubt until the Court finally clarified the
exception's requirements in its 1995 ruling in Schlup v. Delo.'92
186. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (citing the formulations in
Kuhlmann and Carrier and acknowledging the possible differences between the two); see also
supra note 155 (describing McCleskey's ambiguous treatment of the miscarriage-of-justice
exception).
187. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
188. Id. at 335-36.
189. See id. at 347-48.
190. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
191. See Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); McCoy
v. Lockhart, 969 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1992).
192. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
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In Schlup, the Court explained that the miscarriage-of-justice
exception should be cast in a manner that recognizes the states'
strong interest in finality, while still ensuring that habeas relief
remains available for those who are "truly deserving.' 93 The Court
concluded that, although Sawyer would continue to apply to pris-
oners who claimed they were ineligible for the death penalty, "a
somewhat less exacting standard of proof' would apply to prisoners
who claimed they were innocent of any crime.1 4 Returning to the
Court's dictum in Carrier, the Court held that, when a habeas
petitioner seeks to avoid a procedural bar by claiming actual
innocence, he or she must show that, in light of all the available
evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." '195
The Court identified two primary reasons for its conclusion. First,
"challenges to the propriety of imposing a sentence of death are
routinely asserted in capital cases," while claims of actual innocence
remain rare; claims of innocence are made only in those uncommon
instances when a petitioner has obtained "new reliable evidence
-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not
presented at trial." '96 Claims of innocence thus "pose less of a threat
to scarce judicial resources and to principles of finality and comity"
than claims of ineligibility for the death penalty; consequently,
the Court reasoned, a less demanding standard of proof should be
applied in the former category of cases than in the latter.197
Second, the Court concluded that, because "[t]he quintessential
miscarriage of justice is the execution of a person who is entirely
innocent," a prisoner claiming actual innocence should be required
to satisfy a standard that is less demanding than the standard
193. Id. at 321.
194. Id. at 325.
195. Id. at 327. The Court stated that, when making this determination, a federal court is
not bound by the rules of evidence. Id. Moreover, the Court stressed that "[i]t is not the
district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard
addresses; rather the standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic
determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do." Id. at 329.
196. Id. at 324.
197. Id.; see also id. at 322 ("Explicitly tying the miscarriage of justice exception to
innocence ... accommodates both the systemic interests in finality, comity, and conservation
of judicial resources, and the overriding individual interest in doing justice in the
extraordinary case." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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facing a prisoner who merely claims "that his sentence is too
severe.""19 Quoting Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in In re
Winship-the landmark case in which the Court confirmed that
criminal guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt' 99 -the
Court stressed that "a standard of proof represents an attempt to
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclu-
sions for a particular type of adjudication."200 Because it is of
"paramount importance" that society "avoid[] the injustice of
executing one who is actually innocent," the Court held that
prisoners seeking to avoid a procedural bar with a claim of actual
innocence should be required to establish their innocence by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than by evidence that a
federal court finds "clear and convincing.
20 1
To one who worries about the execution or incarceration of
innocent people, the Schlup standard initially looks fairly appealing,
especially when viewed against the backdrop of the far more
stringent standard applied in Sawyer. Even under Schlup, however,
there is a significant gap between the amount of exculpatory
evidence sufficient to generate a profound sense of public discomfort
with a prisoner's punishment and the amount sufficient to trigger
the Court's willingness to forgive a prisoner's procedural failings
and adjudicate the merits of his or her constitutional claims.
Consider, once again, the case of Roger Coleman. When presented
with Coleman's second habeas petition just days before his sched-
uled execution, the district court was asked to determine whether
Coleman qualified for an exception to the general ban on successive
petitions. °2 At that point, of course, neither Sawyer nor Schlup had
been decided. After reviewing the opinions in Kuhlmann and
Carrier, however, the district court concluded that Coleman was
required to make "a colorable showing of 'actual innocence."'" 3 The
court did not say precisely what it understood that standard to
198. Id. at 324-25.
199. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
200. Schiup, 513 U.S. at 325 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
201. Id. at 325-26.
202. See Coleman v. Thompson, 798 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (W.D. Va. 1992).
203. Id. at 1216.
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require, but it is clear that the court was unimpressed by Coleman's
evidence. The exculpatory evidence gathered by that point consisted
primarily of Teresa Horn's claim that Donald Ramey had confessed
to Wanda McCoy's murder; evidence that Roger Matney had lied
when he testified regarding Coleman's alleged jailhouse confession;
affidavits of experts raising questions regarding recent DNA tests
and the second source of sperm found at the murder scene; and the
pry mark that the lead detective originally reported seeing on the
McCoys' door frame during his investigation. °4 The court deter-
mined that "[a]ll of Coleman's evidence which he claims is new and
shows his 'actual innocence' does nothing more than attack the
credibility of witnesses and evidence at the original trial."205 The
most that could be said about Coleman's evidence, the court
concluded, was that if it had been presented at trial, the jury might
have-but need not have-rendered a different verdict." 6 The
court declared itself "satisfied that no 'fundamental miscarriage of
justice' is occurring."2" 7 The Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed.0 8
While Coleman spent his final moments waiting to be placed into
the electric chair, the Supreme Court refused to intervene.0 9
Let us suppose that the district court would have reached
precisely the same conclusion if it had had the benefit of the
Supreme Court's clarifying ruling in Schlup-after all, if the district
court believed Coleman's evidence was inadequate to make "a
colorable showing of actual innocence," it surely would not have
found the evidence sufficient to establish that it was "more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found [Coleman]
204. Id. at 1216-17; see also supra Part II.A (briefly describing some of the key pieces of
exculpatory evidence that Coleman's team had gathered).
205. Coleman, 798 F. Supp. at 1216.
206. Id. at 1217.
207. Id. at 1218; see also id. at 1217 (stating that, according to one expert, DNA tests that
had recently been conducted put Coleman in a group of possible perpetrators that consisted
of only two-tenths of one percent of the population at large).
208. See Coleman v. Thompson, No. 92-4005, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 11440, at *1 (4th Cir.
May 18, 1992) (per curiam) ("[W]e find no error in the district court's conclusion that
petitioner has not established a colorable claim of factual innocence ....").
209. See Coleman v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 188, 188 (1992) (per curiam) ("[D]espite having
had 11 years to produce exculpatory evidence, Coleman has produced what, in the words of
the District Court, does not even amount to a colorable showing of actual innocence." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."21° The defects in the Schiup
standard are revealed by the fact that the district court's refusal to
consider Coleman's constitutional claims did precious little to
advance the cause of finality. The media firestorm that accompanied
Coleman's execution, the investigations that continued to stir up
fears that Virginia had executed an innocent man, and the litigation
and public appeals preceding Governor Warner's decision to
authorize new DNA tests, all make it plain that the federal courts'
procedure-focused handling of Coleman's case did not bring the
desired sense of closure. Even in January 2006, doubts about
Coleman's guilt and public discomfort with the way Coleman's case
had been handled remained sufficiently strong to persuade Gover-
nor Warner to conduct a final round of tests in order, as he put it, to
"follow the available facts to a more complete picture of guilt or
innocence."21'
The miscarriage-of-justice exception's failure to help the courts
achieve finality in Coleman's case should hardly be surprising.
Suppose that the best a death row prisoner can show with new
evidence is that there is a fifty-fifty chance that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him. A federal court applying the Schiup
standard would refuse to forgive any procedural defects that had
saddled the prisoner's efforts to secure habeas relief, and would
refuse to adjudicate the merits of the prisoner's constitutional
claims. Yet a large segment of the public undoubtedly would feel
profoundly disquieted if they believed there was a fifty-fifty chance
that a person whose constitutional rights may have been violated,
and who was about to be executed, was actually innocent of any
crime. Indeed, the constitutional requirement that a person's guilt
be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt is based, in part, on
the need to assure the public that those who have been convicted
are deserving of punishment:
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force
of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that
210. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
211. See Glod & Shear, supra note 7.
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leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being con-
demned.212
The fact that doubts about a person's guilt arise after someone
has been convicted is a matter that, while historically of great
significance to the legal profession, should be expected to have
comparatively little significance in the eyes of the public. Judges
have grown accustomed in criminal cases to viewing individuals
through two very different sets of lenses: one set for the pre-
conviction period, during which a person is entitled to a presump-
tion of innocence, and another set for the post-conviction period,
after a person's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
and he or she thus stands as guilty in the eyes of the law regardless
of any new evidence that comes to light.213 So far as the courts are
concerned, a criminal trial is "a decisive and portentous event" '214
and "the paramount event for determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant."215 The fact that the courts have found it necessary
to compartmentalize the legal status of individuals in this way,
however, certainly does not mean that ordinary citizens are equally
prepared to disregard newly discovered evidence that casts doubt on
the accuracy of a verdict. Indeed, when exculpatory evidence comes
to light following a conviction, it is only reasonable to expect the
public to desire reassurance that the prisoner's punishment is just.
The author of the Time magazine cover story published just two
days before Coleman's execution surely was not voicing an anoma-
lous view when she asked why the courts were in such a rush to
terminate Coleman's judicial proceedings: "[A]dditional time is not
too much to ask," she wrote, "if there is a reasonable doubt that he
is guilty."2 6 Perhaps the public's discomfort need not compel the
federal courts to go into the business of re-adjudicating the guilt and
innocence of state prisoners." 7 But one should not be surprised to
212. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
213. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,398-99 (1993) (stating that "[a] person when
first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence," but a person loses that
presumption after his or her guilt has been proven "beyond a reasonable doubt").
214. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
215. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 416.
216. Smolowe, supra note 3, at 44.
217. See infra notes 236-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reluctance to
grant habeas relief based solely on the strength of a prisoner's proof of innocence).
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find citizens dissatisfied when newly surfaced evidence creates a
troubling measure of uncertainty about a prisoner's guilt, and the
federal courts refuse even to consider the prisoner's claim that his
or her basic constitutional rights were violated.
It is impossible to define the precise point at which exculpatory
evidence becomes sufficiently weighty to undermine the public's
sense of finality about a case-though it seems telling that Time's
reporter felt disturbed by evidence that, in her judgment, raised "a
reasonable doubt" about Coleman's guilt. 218 Yet one need not
precisely identify that threshold in order to learn a powerful lesson
from Coleman's case: the gap between the amount of exculpatory
evidence sufficient to undercut finality and the amount sufficient
to satisfy the Court's formulation of the miscarriage-of-justice
exception is too large to permit the exception effectively to serve
the purposes for which it was intended. A miscarriage-of-justice
exception that does not account for the public's response to newly
discovered exculpatory evidence is poorly calculated to assure
the public that "the ends of justice, 219 have been achieved and
that habeas relief has been extended to those who are "truly
deserving. 2 When doubts about a prisoner's guilt are sufficiently
strong to undercut finality, but insufficiently strong to satisfy the
miscarriage-of-justice exception, we will find ourselves confronted
with the very kind of spectacle that we witnessed in Coleman's
case.2 2' Specifically, in cases where doubts about a prisoner's guilt
will plainly make finality highly elusive, we will nevertheless see
courts blithely citing finality as the principal rationale for refusing
to adjudicate the merits of a prisoner's constitutional claims.
b. Congress's New Formulation
If one believes Schlup did a poor job of calibrating the mis-
carriage-of-justice exception, one will find post-Schlup developments
nothing short of alarming. Beginning with legislation enacted in
218. Smolowe, supra note 3, at 44.
219. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,451 (1986) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 177-
79 and accompanying text (discussing Kuhlmann).
220. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); see supra notes 192-201 and accompanying
text (discussing Schlup).
221. See supra notes 3-7, 11-26 and accompanying text.
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1996, and continuing with a bill introduced in 2005, Congress has
undertaken to replace Schlup's "more likely than not '222 formulation
with the very same "clear and convincing '2 3 standard that the
Schiup Court believed did not accurately reflect "the degree of
confidence our society thinks [a federal court] should have" when
evaluating a habeas petitioner's claim of innocence.224
In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),225 Congress addressed two areas of habeas law in which
the Court had recognized the miscarriage-of-justice exception-
successive petitions and federal evidentiary hearings. With respect
to successive petitions, AEDPA mandates the dismissal of all
claims that have already been adjudicated in prior federal habeas
proceedings.226 Claims presented in a successive petition that have
not yet been federally adjudicated must also be dismissed, unless
the petitioner is either relying on a new, retroactively applicable
rule of constitutional law227 or relying on facts that he or she could
222. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
223. Id. at 323.
224. Id. at 325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
225. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261-2266 (2005)). President Bill
Clinton signed the legislation one year after the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon
Signing S. 735, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 961-1 (Apr. 24, 1996). AEDPA ushered in a wide range of
habeas reforms aimed at reducing the impact of federal habeas proceedings on states' efforts
to punish those convicted of crimes. For example, AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of
limitations on habeas petitions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000); further restricted prisoners'
ability to file successive habeas petitions, see id. § 2244(b); made it more difficult for prisoners
to obtain federal evidentiary hearings, see id. § 2254(e)(2); mandated a strong measure of
deference to state courts' applications of law to fact, see id. § 2254(d); and-for those states
that provide competent counsel to indigent prisoners challenging their capital convictions or
sentences in state post-conviction proceedings-imposed strict deadlines on habeas petitioners
and federal courts alike in order to shorten the time between conviction and execution, see id.
§§ 2261-66.
226. See id. § 2244(b)(1) (stating that claims "presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed"); see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 642-45 (1998) (stating that
a claim was not "presented" in a prior habeas petition within the meaning of the statute
unless it was adjudicated on the merits).
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000). Ordinarily, when the Court declares a new rule
of constitutional law, that rule is applicable only to cases that still are pending on direct
review. In rare instances, however, the Court will declare that a newly created rule applies
even to prisoners who have already completed direct review and who now are seeking either
state or federal collateral relief. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307-10 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (distinguishing between direct and collateral review and introducing the
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not reasonably have discovered earlier and those facts, taken
together with all of the other available evidence, "establish by clear
and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense." '228
AEDPA also places a daunting obstacle in the path of a habeas
petitioner who fails to develop the facts underlying his or her
constitutional claims in state court proceedings. The prisoner will
be denied a federal evidentiary hearing unless he or she is relying
on either a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law
or facts that he or she could not reasonably have discovered
earlier; and in either case, the prisoner must also persuade the
court that the facts underlying his or her claim "establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense." '29 Even when a prisoner seeks the benefit of a
constitutional rule that the Supreme Court has held is retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review,230 therefore, the prisoner
will be denied an evidentiary hearing unless the prisoner can prove
his or her innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
In 2005, companion bills were introduced in Congress that would
have extended the same extraordinarily demanding standard to the
third area in which the Court has applied the miscarriage-of-justice
exception: procedural defaults of the sort that doomed Roger
Coleman's efforts to obtain federal habeas relief."' In an effort to
narrow still further the availability of habeas relief for petitioners
who violate a state's procedural rules, the Streamlined Procedures
Act of 2005 would have barred a federal court from granting habeas
relief on any procedurally defaulted claim unless the applicant could
retroactivity analysis that the Court continues to apply today).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added). In their dissenting opinions in
Schlup, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas voiced
their preference for the "clear and convincing" standard of proof. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 339-42 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.); id. at
355 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
229. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 429-37 (2000) (discussing the statute's requirements).
230. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (briefly referencing the Court's
retroactivity jurisprudence).
231. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, H.R. 3035 109th Cong. § 4 (2005).
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"establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitu-
tional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the appli-
cant guilty of the underlying offense. 232
We have drifted a very long way from Judge Friendly's suggestion
that the habeas remedy be restricted to those prisoners who can
make "a colorable showing of innocence" by demonstrating that, in
light of newly discovered evidence, there is "a fair probability that
... the [jury] would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his
guilt. ' 233 Under AEDPA and the proposed Streamlined Procedures
Act, Congress is revealing a preference for a standard of proof that
is a different animal altogether. Many in Congress have apparently
concluded that, even when a prisoner can prove that he or she is
probably innocent, Americans are content to have the federal courts
ignore the prisoner's constitutional claims and allow the prisoner to
be punished-even executed-if the prisoner's attorneys did not
obey all of the applicable procedural rules and if the prisoner's
exculpatory evidence is not quite clear and convincing. To those
familiar with Roger Coleman's case, it is impossible to agree with
that appraisal of the American public. In cases in which citizens
suspect a prisoner is innocent, Congress's reformulated miscarriage-
of-justice exception is simply incapable of distinguishing between
those cases in which doubts about a prisoner's guilt will frustrate
judicial efforts to give the public a sense of closure and those in
which the dismissal of a prisoner's habeas petition on procedural
grounds will deliver genuine finality.
c. Other Problems with Congress's Standard
If Congress's "clear and convincing" standard had virtues that
counterbalanced its failure to advance the cause of finality in the
face of doubts about a prisoner's guilt, perhaps the case for its
retention would be stronger. Unfortunately, the standard has
additional significant faults.
232. See id. § 4(a) (incorporating by reference 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000)). The bill also
would deny habeas relief on procedurally defaulted claims "unless the denial of such relief is
contrary to, or would entail an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. § 4(a)(2)(B)(5).
233. Friendly, supra note 135, at 160; see supra note 135 and accompanying text
(introducing Friendly's argument).
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Suppose that a prisoner files a procedurally flawed habeas
petition and, after applying Congress's "clear and convincing"
standard, the district court declares that the prisoner has estab-
lished his or her innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
Suppose, further, that when the court proceeds to consider the
prisoner's constitutional claims, the court concludes that those
claims lack merit. The district court is then in the extraordinarily
uncomfortable position of having to permit the execution or
continued incarceration of a person whom the court has said is
clearly and convincingly innocent. That is hardly a state of affairs
calculated to bring credit to the courts, and it certainly is not a state
of affairs calculated to advance the cause of finality. To the contrary,
it is difficult to imagine a scenario with greater power to undermine
the public's confidence in the judiciary than one in which a court has
said that it is convinced of a prisoner's innocence, but that it will
nevertheless refuse to prevent that prisoner's execution or continued
imprisonment. Indeed, federal judges themselves would presumably
find it profoundly demoralizing to be compelled to take that course
of action-and if preserving the morale of state judges is one of the
concerns that ought to shape federal habeas law,234 then surely it is
appropriate to consider the morale of federal judges, as well.
One might respond by arguing that either (1) clear and convincing
proof of innocence ought itself to be sufficient to entitle a prisoner
to federal habeas relief even when the prisoner's trial and sentenc-
ing proceedings were free of constitutional violations, or (2) a
prisoner who can produce clear and convincing evidence of his or her
innocence will surely be granted executive clemency,235 so that
questions of federal habeas relief will become moot. Both responses
are problematic.
In Herrera v. Collins,236 the Court expressed a deep reluctance to
recognize innocence as an independent basis for habeas relief.
Leonel Herrera was an inmate on Texas's death row who claimed
that he was innocent of the murder of which he had been convicted
and that it would violate both the Eighth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment to execute an innocent man. 237 The Justices'
234. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
236. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
237. Id. at 396-97; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII (banning "cruel and unusual
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various opinions sent conflicting signals about the viability of such
a claim. One group constituting a majority expressed a willingness
to consider such an argument in extraordinary circumstances,
23
while another group constituting a majority stressed that Herrera's
evidence fell far short of the measure of persuasiveness that would
be required for such an argument to succeed.2"' Still another
majority, however, expressed reservations about ever granting
habeas relief on a claim of actual innocence when there is a "state
avenue open to process such a claim," such as the possibility of
executive clemency.24 Clemency, this group of Justices wrote, "is
deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the
historic remedy for preventing miscarriages ofjustice where judicial
process has been exhausted.241
In the wake of Herrera, the lower federal courts are reaching
differing conclusions about whether a highly persuasive demonstra-
tion of innocence can itself serve as the basis for habeas relief.242
The Eighth Circuit has indicated that the habeas remedy may be
awarded in such circumstances, but has emphasized that the
petitioner must satisfy "an 'extraordinarily high' standard. In fact,
punishments"); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (banning a state from depriving a person "of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
238. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 ("We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding
this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim."); id. at 419
(O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.) (stating that "the execution of a legally and
factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event"); id. at 429 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence'
made after trial ... would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case.");
id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.) ("Nothing could be
more contrary to contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience, than
to execute a person who is actually innocent." (internal citations omitted)).
239. See id. at 417 (majority opinion) (concluding that Herrera's evidence of innocence was
unpersuasive); id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.) (stating that
Herrera "is not innocent, in any sense of the word"); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that Herrera had fallen "far short" of the required evidentiary showing).
240. See id. at 417 (majority opinion); see also id. at 400 ("Claims of actual innocence based
on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief
absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding."); id. (stating that "federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact").
241. Id. at 411-12.
242. See Edwards v. United States, No. 05-CV0017(NG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12700, at
*10 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2005) (noting the conflict).
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the petitioner must show new facts unquestionably establishing his
innocence."2 43 The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, "has rejected this
possibility and held that claims of actual innocence are not cogniza-
ble on federal habeas review."244 The Fifth Circuit has concluded
that those prisoners who are demonstrably innocent must turn
either to their state courts for appropriate relief or to their state's
executive for clemency.246 Congress, meanwhile, has shown no
inclination to weigh in on the matter.246
When a district court is convinced that a state prisoner is
innocent but that the prisoner's trial and sentencing proceedings
were constitutionally unobjectionable, therefore, it is not at all clear
that the Supreme Court would permit the district court to award the
habeas remedy on the strength of the prisoner's innocence alone. If
the Court did indeed refuse to permit habeas relief in those
circumstances, then Congress's demand that the federal courts find
a prisoner clearly and convincingly innocent before evaluating his
or her constitutional claims would have helped to put the courts in
a deeply untenable position.
Nor can the federal courts or the public readily take comfort in
the belief that, if a prisoner can clearly and convincingly establish
his or her innocence, the state's executive will award the prisoner
clemency and so the courts will not have to worry about how to
dispose of the prisoner's federal habeas petition. Prisoners and
executive officials alike typically wait until judicial proceedings
have been exhausted before focusing their energies on the possibil-
ity of clemency.247 In Roger Coleman's case, for example, Governor
243. Whitfield v. Bowersox, 324 F.3d 1009, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003).
244. Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 2003).
245. See id.
246. Herrera has, however, been the subject of scholarly debate. Compare Arleen Anderson,
Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L.
REV. 489 (1998) (arguing that it is the job of the states, not the federal courts, to correct
factually inaccurate verdicts), with Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of
Innocence for Death-sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 948-50
(1994) (arguing that state prisoners should be deemed to have a constitutional right to file a
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence at any time, even though states
often impose strict time limits on such motions), and Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind
Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 122 (2005)
(criticizing Herrera's reluctance to entertain actual-innocence claims).
247. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993) (stating that clemency 'is the
historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been
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Wilder did not reject Coleman's clemency petition until the very day
of the execution.248 Consequently, a court presented with a procedur-
ally flawed habeas petition ordinarily must dispose of the petition
before either the court or the public learns how the executive will
respond to the prisoner's plea for clemency. If the public suspects
the prisoner is innocent but the court denies the prisoner's request
for habeas relief on procedural grounds, the court still risks being
discredited in the eyes of the public, even if the executive later
comes to the prisoner's aid. The federal courts were excoriated for
their handling of Coleman's first habeas petition long before anyone
knew how Governor Wilder would respond to Coleman's clemency
plea.24
9
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a prisoner who is clearly and
convincingly innocent in the eyes of a federal judge will be awarded
clemency.280 The power to grant clemency "is in many respects the
most unencumbered power enjoyed by" a state's executive branch;251
the executive is free to apply virtually any standards and criteria
that it deems appropriate.252 One can imagine, for example, that an
executive might refuse to grant clemency unless a prisoner can
prove his or her innocence beyond a reasonable doubt-a standard
that is even more demanding than the rigorous "clear and convinc-
exhausted"); Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and
Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003) ("[A] clemency petition is usually a defendant's
final plea for relief from state execution.").
248. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
250. Cf. Heise, supra note 247, at 253 (stating that "clemency's record as a 'fail-safe'
backstop against innocent defendants being put to death by the state is the subject of debate")
(footnote omitted).
251. Richard F. Celeste, Executive Clemency: One Executive's Real Life Decisions, 31 CAP.
U. L. REV. 139, 139 (2003). There is wide variation in the ways in which states structure their
clemency processes; in some states the governor possesses the sole power to grant clemency,
in some states that power is held by a clemency board, and in many states the governor and
a clemency board share the responsibility for evaluating clemency petitions. See Heise, supra
note 247, at 242, 255 (describing the different clemency regimes).
252. See Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive
Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1326-27 (2004)
(emphasizing the executive's broad discretion to grant or deny clemency for virtually any
reason whatsoever); see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1998)
(plurality opinion) (stating that clemency is awarded "as a matter of grace" and that
executives may "consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial
proceedings and sentencing determinations").
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ing" standard that Congress prefers in the habeas context.253 Even
if an executive were to apply the very same "clear and convincing"
standard that the federal court had already deemed met, the
executive might disagree with the court's appraisal of the evidence
and refuse to award clemency. Indeed, by declaring that habeas
relief will remain available to a prisoner whose procedurally flawed
petition is accompanied by clear and convincing proof of the pris-
oner's innocence, Congress itself is presumably manifesting the
judgment that there may be occasions when a clearly innocent
person will need to turn to the federal judiciary for help. After all,
why tether the availability of habeas relief to convincing proof of a
prisoner's innocence, if one is certain that those with convincing
proof of their own innocence will eventually be granted clemency
and thus will not stand in need of the judiciary's intervention?
Finally, if a federal court believes it should deny a prisoner's
procedurally flawed habeas petition because the exculpatory
evidence is not quite "clear and convincing," but the court fears a
public backlash due to widespread doubts about the prisoner's guilt,
the court might be tempted to try to mitigate the public's discomfort
by exaggerating the weaknesses of the prisoner's exculpatory
evidence and declaring that the prisoner's evidentiary showing falls
far short of meeting the "clear and convincing" standard of proof. By
downplaying the strength of the prisoner's evidence, the court
might hope to persuade the public that justice has been done and
that the case is not worthy of further scrutiny. In Coleman's case,
for example, the district court probably overstated the matter when
it declared, just eight days before Coleman's execution, that the
evidence of Coleman's guilt was stronger than ever254a view
eagerly echoed by the Supreme Court the day of Coleman's death.255
That certainly was not the judgment of those who continued to press
253. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 422 (1979) (stating that the "clear and
convincing" standard of proof is an intermediate standard that falls between "preponderance
of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt").
254. Coleman v. Thompson, 798 F. Supp. 1209, 1218-19 (W.D. Va. 1992) ("After a review
of the alleged 'new evidence,' this court finds the case against Coleman as strong or stronger
than the evidence adduced at trial.").
255. Coleman v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 188, 188 (1992) (per curiam) ("[D]espite having had
11 years to produce exculpatory evidence, Coleman has produced what, in the words of the




256for new DNA tests long after Coleman was executed in 1992, nor
was it necessarily the judgment of Governor Warner when he
arranged for the new tests to be conducted in January 2006.57
Exaggerating the weaknesses of a prisoner's exculpatory evidence
not only undermines the integrity of the judicial process, but it may
also make it more difficult for the prisoner to obtain clemency. Once
a court declares that the "clear and convincing" standard has not
been met, a governor fearful of controversy may find it irresistibly
tempting to take cover behind the court's declaration and say that
he or she, like the court, finds the prisoner's exculpatory evidence
unconvincing. It certainly would not be the first time that a
governor presented with a difficult clemency petition has sought
shelter behind a court's refusal to grant the prisoner's request for
relief.25
8
The irony is unmistakable. Over the past twenty years, the
Supreme Court and Congress have worked hard to help states
achieve finality in criminal cases by developing ever-tougher
procedural rules that make it more difficult for state prisoners to
obtain federal habeas relief, even when newly discovered evidence
suggests the prisoner might be innocent.259 By placing an extraordi-
narily strong emphasis on the importance of procedural regularity,
however, today's habeas regime makes finality more difficult to
achieve in cases of suspected innocence, and may make executive
clemency-the remedy that the Court has told us is "the historic
remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process
has been exhausted"26 -harder to obtain.
256. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
257. See Glod & Shear, supra note 7.
258. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency,
17 J.L. & POL. 669, 671-73 (2001) (arguing that governors frequently sidestep responsibility
by deferring to the courts; when George W. Bush was governor of Texas, for example, he
frequently explained his rejection of pleas for clemency by stating that the courts had already
examined the given case carefully).
259. See supra notes 101-20, 225-30 and accompanying text.
260. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993); see supra notes 236-41 and
accompanying text (discussing Herrera).
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CONCLUSION
Both Congress and the Court have done an exceptionally poor job
of devising a habeas regime that takes account of the elusiveness of
finality when the public feels it has reason to doubt a prisoner's
guilt. The miscarriage-of-justice exception had the potential to
resolve the tension between finality and suspected innocence. The
exception could have been crafted in a manner that would ensure
that, when there were reasonable suspicions that a person had been
found guilty of a crime he or she did not commit, the federal courts
would evaluate the merits of the prisoner's constitutional claims and
either grant or deny habeas relief accordingly. Instead, the amount
of exculpatory evidence required to satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice
exception is now so great that it vastly exceeds the amount of
exculpatory evidence sufficient to thwart finality by giving citizens
reason to fear that justice has not been done.26' In the name of
finality, therefore, a federal court today will dismiss a habeas
petition on procedural grounds even when doubts about the pris-
oner's guilt will make finality exceptionally difficult to achieve.
Cases like Roger Coleman's do not come along every day.262 Few
prisoners are able to attract the degree of national and international
attention that Coleman drew in the months leading up to his
execution, and few executions are second-guessed as persistently as
Coleman's was until the results of new DNA tests were announced
in January 2006. An unusual convergence of powerful forces made
Coleman's case particularly newsworthy: the evidence of Coleman's
innocence struck many observers as far from negligible; a young
man who lived right next door to the victim was rumored to have
confessed to the crime; Coleman eloquently maintained his inno-
cence right until the moment of his electrocution; the Supreme
Court used Coleman's case as the occasion for announcing a new
level of respect for state procedural rules2 3 despite the fact that
Coleman's procedural error seemed extraordinarily minor; a forensic
scientist stubbornly insisted on preserving physical evidence until
DNA technology would permit a conclusive determination of
261. See supra Part III.B.1.
262. See supra notes 1-32 for an overview of Coleman's case.
263. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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Coleman's guilt; and Coleman had the benefit of attorneys and
supporters willing to devote tremendous energy to vindicating his
claim of innocence, even long after his death. It is hardly surprising
that Coleman's case proved so resistant to closure.
Even if a number of those extraordinary features had been
absent, however, finality still would have been very difficult to
achieve. Although the rest of the world undoubtedly would have
shifted its attention elsewhere long ago, the town of Grundy would
have remained the site of rumors and speculations long after
Coleman's execution, with some insisting that Coleman was guilty
and others insisting that the true murderer had escaped punish-
ment and allowed Coleman to go to the electric chair in his place.
Even absent the national spotlight, the dismissal of Coleman's
habeas petition on procedural grounds would have sorely tested the
Grundy community's confidence in the criminal justice system, and
a genuine sense of repose would have arrived in that town only
with the passing of many years.2 For a case to resist finality, one
does not need the relentless attention of the national media. All
one needs is a community that fears it has been the site of a
gross miscarriage ofjustice. By adjudicating the merits of Coleman's
procedurally defaulted constitutional claims, the federal courts
admittedly would not have been able to resolve the ultimate
question of Coleman's guilt. But merits-focused federal habeas
proceedings would have bolstered the public's confidence that the
courts had pursued justice the best that they could.
Finality in criminal cases is indisputably a worthy goal--criminal
convictions should not be second-guessed without end. Procedural
rules, moreover, have an important role to play in ensuring that
criminal litigation proceeds steadily toward closure. Indeed, we
adopt and enforce procedural rules to ensure that disputes are
resolved in a manner that is fair, efficient, and ultimately worthy
of respect. But when procedural requirements are so rigorously
enforced that the public is given good cause to believe that courts
ascribe greater value to procedural impeccability than to substan-
tive justice, citizens justifiably lose confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system. At that point, it is only the rhetoric-and
not the reality-of finality that has triumphed.
264. Cf. supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text (discussing the components of finality).
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